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Circuit breakers: Back to
the basics
In October 1987, the Dow Jones Indus-
trial Average (DJIA) fell 508 points to
1,738 and the Standard & Poors (S&P)
500 futures dropped 80.75 points to
201.50 in one day.1 In 1988, a number
of studies of the crash recommended
implementing temporary trading halts
or circuit breakers at the equity related
exchanges when the stock market
declined significantly. One of these
studies, by the Presidential Working
Group on Financial Markets (the Work-
ing Group), cited the following prin-
ciples upon which circuit breakers
should be based: that artificial trading
halts should be infrequent events and
that coordination of halts among all
equity-related markets is vital. In this
Chicago Fed Letter, I review the back-
ground of circuit breakers, describe
their key principles, examine how the
current intervention mechanisms vio-
late these principles, and make sugges-
tions for improvements.
Development and design
Circuit breakers take several different
forms, but all are designed to artificially
limit or interrupt trading in a particu-
lar instrument. At its inception in 1982,
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s
(CME) S&P 500 futures contract, which
is based on 500 stocks predominantly
traded on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), had a daily price limit equal
to a 3% movement. In 1983, the limit
was removed, and the futures index
contract traded without restraint until
shortly after the 1987 crash, when a
30-point daily limit was temporarily
adopted. Like the CME, the NYSE had
no circuit breakers in place in October
1987. It was not long before a number
of reports addressed circuit breakers
on a conceptual level. The Working
Group specifically recommended a
one-hour trading halt at the NYSE
after a drop of 250 points in the DJIA
and a two-hour trading halt after a drop
of 400 points. The report further pro-
posed coordinated halts for all equity-
related markets.
In February 1988, the NYSE proposed
Rule 80A, its first official circuit breaker,
the “collar” rule.2 Rule 80A prohibited
index arbitrage traders from executing
trades through the NYSE’s automated
transaction system, DOT (Designated
Order Turnaround), after the DJIA
moved 50 points in either direction
from its previous settlement price. In
October 1988, the NYSE implemented
Rule 80B, which imposed a one-hour
halt after a 250-point decline in the
DJIA and a two-hour halt after a 400-
point decline, in line with the Working
Group’s recommendations. The NYSE
also amended Rule 80A to include a
five-minute delay for program trades
through the DOT system if the S&P
500 futures index fell 12 points from
its previous closing price. This is known
as the “sidecar” rule. The collar and
sidecar rules are intended to limit the
volume of trades initiated by arbitragers,
whose simultaneous trades in each mar-
ket align the prices of the individual
stocks comprising the S&P 500 index
and the CME index futures contract.
Delaying or temporarily prohibiting
the orders on the NYSE leg of the ar-
bitrage trade increases the execution
cost and risk for arbitragers and widens
the price spread between the markets.
In October 1988, the CME instituted
circuit breakers—a one-hour halt after
a 30-point decrease in the S&P 500
futures index and a two-hour halt after
a 50-point decrease. The CME added
a 30-minute trading halt or “speed
bump” after a 12-point decrease in
the futures index to combat the mis-
perception that futures caused price
declines. The index futures market is
generally more liquid than the stock
markets. Traders can change the size
of their portfolios more cheaply and
quickly in the futures market than in
the stock market. Therefore, the S&P
500 futures price tends to adjust to
new information more quickly and to
precede the NYSE in price declines.
Intermediate circuit breakers give
NYSE stock prices time to reach com-
parable levels.
Over the years, circuit breakers at both
the NYSE and CME have been expand-
ed, with the most recent changes ap-
proved by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the Commod-
ities Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC), effective April 15, 1998. At
the NYSE, trading will be suspended
on a decline of 10%, 20%, and 30% of
the DJIA average closing price, rounded
to the nearest 50 points. The levels are
adjusted quarterly and the length of
the trading halts depends on the time
of day. The collar and sidecar rules re-
main in effect at their original levels.
The CME trading halts are also based
on percentages, though the maximum
daily price decline is 20%. In addition,
the futures exchange has expanded
its speed bumps to 2.5% and 5%
declines in the index. As with the
NYSE, the CME trigger levels are
reset quarterly, based on the index’s
daily average during the prior month,
rounded to the nearest 10 points.
Infrequency and coordination
Infrequency and coordination are the
key principles of the circuit breaker
recommendations in several of the
1987 studies. The Working Group,
comprising the chairpersons of the
Treasury, Federal Reserve, CFTC, and
SEC, concluded:
“[A] circuit breaker mechanism
should be put in place that oper-
ates in a coordinated fashion across
all markets, using pre-established
limits broad enough to be tripped
only on rare occasions, but which
are sufficient to support the abilityof payment and credit systems to
keep pace with extraordinarily
large market declines.”3
Infrequency
Several of the 1988 reports concurred
that artificial trade disruptions are
undesirable. However, on rare occasions
when the market falls precipitously, as
in October 1987, systems may fail
causing trading delays or halts. Unprec-
edented volume seriously debilitated
the DOT system. The Federal Reserve
wire transfer system, FedWire, suffered
delays and halts, slowing the flow of
funds among clearinghouses, settle-
ment banks, and investors. Banks had
difficulty assessing their customers’
credit quality because the clearing-
houses’ solvency was uncertain. This,
in turn, delayed their decision to lend
to market participants. At one point,
the Chicago Board Options Exchange
(CBOE) and CME suspended trading
in their equity derivative contracts,
because, although the NYSE was offi-
cially open, over 20% of the underlying
stocks were not trading. The Working
Group concluded that it was preferable
to replace disruptive, unplanned halts
with predetermined, coordinated halts.
However, these artificial trading halts
were intended to be infrequent. There-
fore, circuit breakers should be revised
periodically to maintain the percent-
ages originally imposed—12% and
20%. Both the Federal Reserve and
the SEC reiterated the infrequency
theme in testimony before a Senate
subcommittee in January 1998.4
Other reports recognized that limiting
price changes beyond extreme cases
impedes price discovery and prevents
participants from efficiently managing
their portfolios. This effectively in-
creases risk and cost to all market par-
ticipants and decreases liquidity. Both
the speed bumps at the CME and the
collar and sidecar rules at the NYSE
violate the infrequency principle. The
collar rule was triggered more than
once a day on average in 1997, nearly
three times the number of occurrences
from 1990 through 1995 (see figure
1). While the NYSE sidecar rule and
the CME initial speed bump were trig-
gered less often, it is doubtful that
payment, operating, or credit systems
were in jeopardy 37 or 19 times last
year. The capacity and integrity of
these systems have improved since
circuit breakers were introduced, in
effect further eroding arguments favor-
ing circuit breakers.
Coordination
The Report to the President by the
Task Force on Market Mechanisms,
or the Brady Report, explained that
the stock, stock index futures, and
options markets effectively constitute
one market linked by arbitrage and
influenced by the same economic fac-
tors. As a result, uncoordinated cir-
cuit breakers have destabilizing
effects on markets that remain open.
However, even the latest versions of
circuit breakers violate the coordina-
tion principle in several respects. First,
the S&P 500 futures index at the CME
has a maximum daily price limit of
20%, while the NYSE and many other
exchanges allow a 30% daily decline.
These divergent policies may cause a
substantial liquidity strain for partici-
pants of both the exchanges and the
payment system. Consider a CBOE
trader with a losing option position
in an equity market that has dropped
30% and an offsetting CME contract
in S&P 500 futures, where trading has
been halted after a 20% decline. A
customer eligible to participate in the
cross-margining agreement between
the CME and the CBOE’s clearing-
house is able to net her margin require-
ment. Generally, this results in an 85%
margin savings. However, on this par-
ticular day, the trader must provide
margin representing the 10% differ-
ence because the futures contract is
valued at the abbreviated limit price.
As the trader (and all others affected
by this difference) seeks credit to cov-
er this gap, systemwide liquidity may
be strained. Currently, the CME and
the CBOE’s clearinghouse are collab-
orating on a model that would elimi-
nate the cross-margin gap by giving
the customer credit as if the futures
contract actually declined by 30%.
While this solves the liquidity prob-
lem for the traders, it increases the
CBOE clearinghouse’s exposure to
CME clearinghouse failure.
Extension of the daily limit to 30% by
the NYSE compromised the exchange’s
desire to protect investors from ex-
treme volatility and opposition from
the SEC and Fed to closing the market
early. The Fed listed several reasons
against a daily limit, including poten-
tial erosion of investor confidence,
the disadvantage for small investors
with fewer alternatives outside the
NYSE, and the increased difficulty of
re-opening the market the next day.
Further, the Fed stressed the need
for closing prices to revalue portfolios
and manage market and credit risk.
The SEC pointed out that the markets
should remain open to facilitate routine
market activities and futures and op-
tion strategies and to alleviate the
redemption pressures on the mutual
fund industry.
When redeeming shares, mutual fund
investors receive the net asset value
as of the day’s end. If it appeared that
circuit breakers would limit a price
decline by closing the market prema-
turely, investors would have an incen-
tive to redeem their shares at an
artificially high level. If redemptions
were greater than cash reserves, fund
managers would be forced to liquidate
part of their portfolio, exacerbating
the decline. Given that there are 40
million investors with $3 trillion invest-
ed, it is not surprising that the NYSE
raised its daily price limit to 30%.
To provide an example of the volume
of money that may move through the
clearing and payment systems follow-
ing a decline, consider the case of
FedWire in October 1997. A record
$3.7 billion moved through FedWire
following a mere 7.4% market decline.
Because of its concern about payments
following a decline, the CME clearing-
house opted for a 20% limit. Circuit
breakers limit the financial exposure
of the exchange and its members by
placing a cap on margin payments that
firms have to make and settlement
banks have to commit or lend. The
clearinghouse is more concerned about
the risk from the volume and dollar
value of transactions that must be set-
tled than the lack of transparency
resulting from the limit on prices. The
CME faces similar exposure to member
default and payment system strain
from a 10% or 20% market increase,
yet it has no circuit breakers in place
to cover this possibility.
The CME clearinghouse prefers the
20% limit because the later in the day
the decline occurs, the more costly it
becomes for firms to get credit. How-
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is likely to have had several special
early margin calls, reducing its expo-
sure to member default and leaving
a smaller percentage of liquidity that
customers would be required to pro-
vide late in the day. Finally, some argue
that the CME imposes a stricter daily
limit to avoid the blame for causing
price declines.
The intermediate price limits at both
the NYSE and the CME represent
another violation of the coordination
principle. The NYSE’s collar and side-
car restrictions, intended to curb index
arbitrage, are not coordinated with re-
strictions of any other exchange trading
equity products. Similarly, the CME’s
speed bumps do not correspond to
circuit breakers at other exchanges.
Further, the NYSE and CME circuit
breaker levels are based on different
indexes. Price limits and trading halts
at the CME are based on the S&P 500
futures index, while halts at the NYSE
are based on the DJIA. As long as the
relationship between the two indexes
remains constant, trading halts occur
simultaneously. However, if one index
falls more rapidly than the other and
index arbitrage is not allowed to correct
the price discrepancy, circuit breakers
will be triggered at different times.
One of the most important reasons
the NYSE stops trading based on a
prespecified decline in the DJIA is
that the component stocks are traded
on the exchange and have very liquid
markets. Also, the DJIA is a stock market
indicator recognized by most investors.
The CME closes trading on its S&P
500 futures contract based on de-
clines in that index so that traders
on the exchange will know precisely
when their contract will halt trading,
increasing their ability to execute
their strategies. Furthermore, with
500 component stocks, the index
better represents the market than
the 30-stock DJIA. A new closure
rule for all equity-related markets
could be based on the number of
actively trading stocks at the NYSE.
Such a rule, which the CBOE applied
in 1987, officially halts trading when
a certain percentage of individual
stocks cease to trade. This is a better
indicator of capacity strains than an
arbitrary percentage price decline.
Conclusion
As recently as May 1998, the Working
Group recommended that the NYSE
reevaluate the effectiveness of its col-
lar and sidecar rules.5 Based on the
Working Group’s original recommen-
dations of infrequent and coordinated
circuit breakers in all exchange-traded
equity venues, superfluous price lim-
its at all exchanges should be elimi-
nated and the remaining ones should
be replicated across all equity markets
uniformly. While coordination be-
tween exchanges is challenging, it is
vital to recognize that all exchanges
are affected by the capacity of the
others. Given the complex nature of
margins and settlements, the parties
best able to resolve the dilemma are
the exchanges themselves. However,
the SEC and the CFTC should require
strict adherence to the fundamental
principles in both the current versions




1. Circuit breaker triggers
Note: The 350-point and 550-point trigger levels at the NYSE were not triggered from 1990 to 1996
and were triggered once each in 1997.
Source: New York Stock Exchange Web page and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
1Report of the Presidential Task Force on
Market Mechanisms, January 1988, p. 36.
2Beginning on the day following the crash,
the NYSE prohibited the use of the DOT
system for executing certain index arbitrage
trades. (Report of the Presidential Task Force
on Market Mechanisms, January 1988, p. 40).
3U.S. Senate, hearing before the Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
“The conclusions and recommendations of
the President’s ‘Working Group on Financial
Markets’,” May 24, 1988.
4Arthur Levitt, chairman, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, testimony before the
Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, January 29, 1998; Susan M. Phillips,
Governor, Federal Reserve Board, testimony
before the Subcommittee on Securities of
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, January 29, 1998.
5Greg Ip, “Regulators target Big Board’s
50-point ‘collar’,” Wall Street Journal, May 9,
1998, p. C23.
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(millions, seasonally adj. annual rate)
May Month ago Year ago
Cars 5.6 5.5 5.8




Apr. Month ago Year ago
CFMMI 125.7 125.2 122.0
125.4 130.5 130.8 IP
Purchasing managers’ surveys:
net % reporting production growth
May Month ago Year ago
MW 63.0 64.9 56.8






Motor vehicle production (millions, seasonally adj. annual rate)
Cars
Light trucks
Tracking Midwest manufacturing activity
Sources: The Chicago Fed Midwest Manufactur-
ing Index (CFMMI) is a composite index of 16
industries, based on monthly hours worked and
kilowatt hours.   IP represents the Federal
Reserve Board’s Industrial Production Index
for the U.S. manufacturing sector. Autos and
light trucks are measured in annualized units,
using seasonal adjustments developed by the
Board. The purchasing managers’ survey data
for the Midwest are weighted averages of the
seasonally adjusted production components
from the Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee Pur-
chasing Managers’ Association surveys, with
assistance from Bishop Associates, Comerica,
and the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee.
Total light motor vehicle production (seasonally adjusted annual rate) increased
from 11.9 million units in April to 12.1 million units in May. Light truck produc-
tion increased from 6.4 million units in April to 6.5 million units in May and car
production increased from 5.5 million to 5.6 million units during this period.
The Chicago Fed Midwest Manufacturing Index (CFMMI) increased slightly
from 125.2 in March to 125.7 in April. By comparison, the Federal Reserve Board’s
Industrial Production Index for manufacturing (IP) also increased from 130.5
in March to 130.8 in April.
The Midwest purchasing managers’ composite index for production decreased
to 63.0% in May from 64.9% in April. Purchasing managers’ indexes decreased
in Chicago and Milwaukee, but increased in Detroit. The national purchasing
managers’ composite index increased from 53.4% in April to 54.1% in May.